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Summary
European countries have enhanced the scope of private provision
within their health care systems. Privatizing services have been sug-
gested as a means to improve access, quality, and efficiency in health
care. This raises questions about the relative performance of private
hospitals compared with public hospitals. Most systematic reviews
that scrutinize the performance of the private hospitals originate from
the United States. A systematic overview for Europe is nonexisting.
We fill this gap with a systematic realist review comparing the perfor-
mance of public hospitals to private hospitals on efficiency, accessibil-
ity, and quality of care in the European Union. This review synthesizes
evidence from Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Greece,
Austria, Spain, and Portugal.Most evidence suggests that public hospi-
tals are at least as efficient as or are more efficient than private hospi-
tals. Accessibility to broader populations is often a matter of concern
in private provision: Patients with higher social‐economic back-
grounds hold better access to private hospital provision, especially in
private parallel systems such as the United Kingdom and Greece.
The existing evidence on quality of care is often too diverse to make
a conclusive statement. In conclusion, the growth in private hospital
provision seems not related to improvements in performance in
Europe. Our evidence further suggests that the private (for‐profit) hos-
pital sector seems to react more strongly to (financial) incentives than
other provider types. In such cases, policymakers either should very
carefully develop adequate incentive structures or be hesitant to
accommodate the growth of the private hospital sector.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
It is an ongoing debate what the role of the private sector in the health care system should be. In theory, under com-
petitive forces and the right preconditions, private hospitals might outperform public providers. However, empirical
evidence, mostly originating from the United States, does not confirm such hypothesis.1-3 For example, Schlesinger
and Gray3 find that although the evidence is mixed, it seems to favor nonprofit hospitals. Eggleston et al4 analyzing
differences in quality of care also find mixed evidence. Herrera et al5 provide an overview of systematic reviews
focusing on quality of for‐profit (FP), not‐for‐profit (NFP), and public providers. Among other things, they concluded
that FP providers have higher mortality rates. The US studies illustrate that NFP hospitals seem to mimic FP hospitals
on more competitive markets, which might blur the distinctions between both ownership types.6
Most European health markets are both less competitive and more inclusive than the United States, which may
provide private providers with different incentives. During the past decades, a high amount of public provision
spurred discussions about possible inefficiencies, and a movement towards privatization could be observed across
Europe.7,8 Nowadays, practically all European Union (EU) health systems “contract” both public and private providers.
However, EU countries do differ regarding the scale and scope of private hospitals. In most Bismarck‐type systems,
private hospitals may be on par with public hospitals: Public and private providers provide comparable services and
are reimbursed in a similar way. However, in most Beveridge systems, the private sector runs parallel to the public
sector as an alternative provision.8 The private sector then also is paid through a parallel private funding scheme
(ie, out‐of‐pocket payments or private insurance). Such systematic differences may influence the composition and
performance of private hospitals. Furthermore, countries differ on the extent of privatization. In some countries, such
as the Nordic countries, hospital ownership is predominantly public, while in other countries, such as the Netherlands,
public ownership is nonexistent.
It is currently unknown whether private hospitals outperform public hospitals in the different European health
systems. Reviews on this topic are to the best of our knowledge nonexistent. The main aim of this review is to com-
pare the private sector with the public sector on efficiency, quality, and accessibility of services within the EU. We are
well aware that the profit status of private hospitals is most likely an important theoretical confounder in explaining
differences in performance ever since Arrow9 pointed to the fact that private nonprofit status might function as a
way to limit market imperfections in situations of unobservable performance of information asymmetries.9 However,
distinctions between public and private provisions are often at least as important as institutional demarcations, as the
distinction between FP and NFP hospitals. That is the reason that we focus on the distinction between public and pri-
vate. However, if indicated in the included studies, we also differentiate our results between FP and NFP private
hospitals.
Our review contributes in 3 ways: (1) to map available literature and to highlight knowledge voids, (2) to identify
differences between private and public provisions, and, finally, (3) to find institutional and health care system related
drivers for differences in efficiency, accessibility, and quality of care.
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Definitions
Public hospitals can be either state owned or fully run by public entities; private ownership can be mission driven
(NFP) or return driven (FP).10 The term “private” hospitals will be used as an encompassing term throughout this paper,
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making no distinction between NPF and FP. To compare public and private hospitals, this review will investigate 3 umbrella
outcomes: (1) efficiency, (2) accessibility, and (3) quality of care. Efficiency holds the notion as the extent to which objectives
are achieved in relation to the resources consumed.11 This includes both productivity measures on the basis of frontier anal-
ysis or other regression‐based approached, efficiency ratios (eg, employment ratios), and other efficiency outcomes such as
length of stay (LOS) or responsiveness to demand. Themost applied productivitymethods are the stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA) and the data envelopment analysis (DEA).1,12 Efficiency measures are reflected in multiple indicators such as technical
efficiency (maximumoutput from a given set of inputs or aminimum set of inputs with a given set of outputs), cost efficiency
(technical efficiency accounting for the input price), scale efficiency (when the size of the unit is at its optimum), and/or
allocative/profit efficiency (cost minimization or profit maximization).13 Accessibility is categorized into financial affordability,
physical access, informed access, and timely access (eg, waiting times).14 Quality of care is structured along the lines of the
Donabedian model of structure, process, and outcomes.15 Some studied indicators, such as LOS, can be classified under dif-
ferent domains within the Donabedian framework. On the basis of consultations during 2 expert meetings, such indicators
were classified towards the most suitable domain. Another difficulty arises with practice variation. To illustrate, does a high
rate of surgical interventions indicate better or poor quality of care? To avoid the complex discussion on practice variation
and the ambiguous relationship with quality of care, this review does not look into variation in practices.
2.2 | Realist review
Our study follows a realist review approach. A realistic review is suited to review interventions that are embedded in complex
systems, whereby outcomes are dependent and influenced by their contexts.16 Rationales and drivers behind the implemen-
tation or growth of the private sector are diverse. Because of the peculiar nature of our “intervention,”minor deviations from
the realist review protocol were necessary (ie, no explicit distinction is made between intervention, context, andmechanism).
This review limits its territory to the EU (28 countries), because the EU countries are, to a certain extent, comparable but have
various health care systems. The variety of health care systems can be used to explore how private hospitals performwithin
various settings. We strive towards a review that “delivers illumination rather than generalizable truths and contextual fine‐
tuning rather than standardization.”16(p24) Hence, the empirical findings are embedded within descriptive context.
2.3 | Search strategy
The review was conducted from August to October 2015 and updated in June 2017. Data management was done by
using Mendeley and Excel. Four databases were searched: Scopus, SocINDEX, Web of Science, and EconLit. Grey lit-
erature was excluded. The searches in the relevant databases were updated in June 2017. Different search terms
were tested before the actual selection of the articles, to reassure the quality and relevance of the included hits.
Table 1 shows the search terms in a simplified manner; in Table A1, the complete search string is given.
2.4 | Selection process
Figure 1 shows the flow chart of the review process. Only research after 2000, conducted in the EU and articles writ-
ten in English, were included. Papers were included by matching them with the 5 Population, Intervention,
Comparison, Outcome and Study Design (PICOS) criteria (Table 2). To safeguard quality and limit selection bias, the
full‐text and appraisal stage was performed by 2 reviewers.
Articles were assessed using a standard format to appraise the quality of the studies (see Table A2). The main
criteria for exclusion were as follows: (1) research designs were considered to be (extremely) weak and (2) poor
TABLE 1 Search terms in abstract, keywords, and title (simplified)
Intervention: private hospital OR privatization OR public‐private hospital, OR hospital ownership OR for‐profit hospital
Outcome: efficiency OR health care quality OR health care accessibility OR hospital admission OR patient admission OR
health care delivery OR affordability OR health care utilization OR health care availability
AND NOT: job satisfaction OR Medicare in keywords (for <2008, United States in Keywords)
Limitations: Journal articles in English after 2000
e436 KRUSE ET AL.
reporting on the dataset and methodology, or no possibility of a critical appraisal. The 2 reviewers only included evi-
dence, whereby the quality assessment demonstrated that the findings contributed to our research objective (in
Table A3 the excluded references in quality appraisal phase). In total, 35 articles could be included.
A snowballing procedure was performed in December 2015 and January 2016. Forward snowballing identifies
articles that refer to the selected articles in the review. Backward snowballing means that the reference list of the arti-
cles was included into the review process. Additionally, the literature selected in other systematic reviews covering the
EU was included.1,2,12,17,18 Such a snowballing methodology has been assessed as a successful addition to the system-
atic review by advocates of realist reviews.16 Articles conceived to be useful upon the PICOS criteria went through the
same inclusion process. In total, another 10 articles could be included, bringing the total number of studies to 45.
3 | RESULTS
The selected articles are shown in summary tables inTable A4. Thirteen articles originated from Italy, 8 from Germany,
7 from the United Kingdom, 6 from France, 5 from Greece, 3 from Austria, 2 from Spain, and 1 from Portugal. While in
Germany, Italy, France, and Austria most private hospitals act as a substitute for public hospitals, in the UK, Portugal,
Spain, and Greece, most private hospitals do complement the public system.
3.1 | Efficiency
We found 12 articles using productivity functions assessing primarily technical efficiency. 3 studies analyzing profit
and/or cost efficiency, and 10 articles reflecting other efficiency measures (eg, LOS). The evidence on technical
FIGURE 1 Flow chart of selection process
TABLE 2 Inclusion criteria for the second phase
Population Private hospitals; this could be a nonprofit or for‐profit hospital. Papers that include private hospitals
as a control variable are also considered to be eligible.
Intervention/
exposure
Patients are exposed to the service delivery of private hospitals.
Comparison A comparison should be made with public hospitals.
Outcome One of the following 3 elements should be covered: efficiency, quality of care, and accessibility.
Articles that only include employment conditions are not taken into consideration.
Study design Empirical research, no descriptive papers or economic modeling are included.
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efficiency shows no unambiguous conclusion can be made that FP and NFP hospitals are more (cost and/or technical)
efficient than public hospitals, although public hospitals seem to be just as efficient as or more efficient than private
hospitals. The findings on the other efficiency measures indicate that private hospitals seem to be more responsive to
(financial) incentives.
3.1.1 | Productivity functions
The studies that estimated technical and/or cost efficiency use a DEA19-22 or an SFA model.23-27 Other studies con-
trast multiple approaches, SFA versus DEA.28-30 The (adjusted) discharged patients23,29 and the number of inpatient
(weighted) cases were most often used as output parameters.20,21,24,25,30 Diagnosis‐related groups (DRGs),19,22 out-
patient visits,19 and differentiation of specific procedures (eg, number of complex surgery and emergency room treat-
ments)27,29 were used less frequently. Regarding input factors, most studies used the number of beds as a proxy for
capital investments; one study used the amount spent on supplies as measurement of the capital used.20 To identify
labor inputs, all studies incorporate the number of full‐time equivalents of physicians, nurses, and other staff members
(eg, administrative, nonclinicians, and teaching staff); one study could not include full‐time equivalents, but only the
number of staff members because of data limitations.27
Only the results on technical efficiency are grouped in Table 3, since this was the dominant outcome and
enhances comparability. The findings show mixed results (Table 3), but do indicate more favorable results for pub-
lic hospitals. Four German studies found that public hospitals were more efficient than FP hospitals.21,28,30 One
possible explanation is that local governments sell the inefficient hospitals to the private sector.28 Also, German
FP hospitals with over a thousand beds were found to operate more efficiently.21 In Italy, one study found that
FP hospitals (Lazio Regio) were less technical efficient than public hospitals.27 Whereas when comparing NFP hos-
pitals and public hospitals, the different methodologies and years covered caused divergent results.27 Three stud-
ies also concluded that NFP hospitals were less efficient in Germany.21,24,30 Berta et al23 reveal that Italian FP
hospitals are less efficient than their public/nonprofit counterparts, but over time have converged towards the
same efficiency level as other types. Similar converging results were found in Germany.25 NFP hospitals in Ger-
many and Italy also show convergent efficiency scores according to a total of 4 studies.20,22,23,29 Two studies,
from Austria and Germany, reasoned that private providers are more efficient than public hospitals.19,20 The Ger-
man study analyzed the process of privatization, whereby hospitals that converted to FP status also increased
their efficiency. This indicates that a longitudinal design might show different results than cross‐sectional designs.
Hospitals that converted to NFP status initially also show increases in efficiency; however, these diminish over
time.20 In the case of Portugal, one study concludes that private hospitals were more cost‐efficient than their pub-
lic counterparts.26 Using a different methodology—nonoriented super efficiency and different sample selections—
no difference in efficiency was found.22
The overarching message in most studies might actually be the fact that reimbursement schemes are of impor-
tance. In Italy, FP hospitals were found to be less efficient because they use resources less efficiently. This might
be due to the fact that private FP hospitals are confronted with specific regulations that set a limit to the number
of funded admissions; since such limits fluctuate over time and are quite volatile, FP hospitals might face problems
TABLE 3 Overview technical efficiency of private hospitals compared with public hospitals
Less Efficient No Difference More Efficient
FP 5 studies from Germany and Italy find
private FP hospitals less efficient
than public hospitals21,24,27,28,30
2 studies from Germany and Italy find
no difference between private FP
and public hospitals23,25
1 study from Germany finds
private FP hospitals to be more
efficient than public hospitals20
NFP 3 studies from Germany find private
NFP hospitals to be less efficient
than public21,24,30
4 studies from Germany and Italy find
no difference between private NFP
and public hospitals20,22,23,29
1 study from Austria finds private
NFP hospitals to be more
efficient than public hospitals19
Abbreviations: FP, for‐profit; NFP, not‐for‐profit.
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to adjust fixed input resources accordingly.27 Another indication of the importance of funding schemes might be the
fact that after a DRG‐based payment system had been introduced in Italy, NFP hospitals converged to the same levels
of technical efficiency as public hospitals.29 In Germany, Herr et al25 also found no statistically significant differences
in technical efficiency between FP and public hospitals after a DRG‐based payment system had been introduced in
2004. Earlier, Herr24 showed that private hospitals were on average less cost and technical efficient, maybe because
of the fact that in that timeframe, there existed an incentive to increase LOS to raise revenues. Nonetheless, FP hos-
pitals were found to be more profit efficient than public hospitals, meaning that hospitals have certain output prices
and input prices, and FP hospitals choose the best combination of both input and output factors.25 However, another
study discovered that under the DRG payment system, efficiency gains among FP‐privatized hospitals were signifi-
cantly lower compared with before the DRG payment system.20 The Austrian DRG system only covers up to 50%
of hospital costs, and additional funds come from states and operational‐deficit coverage, determined ex post by
the local authorities. Such funds disproportionally accrue to public providers placing the private sector at bay, but pos-
sibly also increasing their incentives to operate more cost conscious.19
3.1.2 | Other efficiency outcomes
A subset of studies do use other outcomes to assess the efficiency of hospital providers. Multiple studies analyze the
relationship between ownership and LOS (Table 4). A short case‐mixed LOS is seen as an indicator of superior effi-
ciency. French private hospitals have longer LOS for knee procedures, but shorter LOS for hip procedures.31 For most
diagnostic groups, there exists no difference in LOS between UK public hospitals and private independent sector
treatment centers (ISTCs), although for some treatments, particularly hip and knee procedures, a longer LOS was
found for National Health Service (NHS) hospitals.32 Another study using the same dataset as the former study sup-
ports the latter findings, whereby LOS in ISTCs is shorter than in public hospitals for hip replacements.33 Evidence
from Italy reports shorter LOS in private hospitals for aortic valve substitution.34 However, LOS was found to be lon-
ger in Italian private psychiatric hospitals.35 The authors explain this by private psychiatric hospitals being funded on a
per diem basis, creating incentives to increase LOS. Indeed, in Greece, LOS was also higher in private mental health
clinics.36 This alludes to the assumption that FP providers seem to apply more revenue‐maximizing strategies. Overall,
per diem funding structures—as in mental health—seem to increase LOS among private providers, while prospective
structures as in acute care seem to create an opposing effect. Both underline the idea that the private providers
TABLE 4 Other efficiency measures
Outcome/
Indicator
Number
of Studies Type (Private) Countries Impact
LOS 3 Aortic valve substitution, hip and knee procedures in
private hospitals or ISTCs
Italy, United
Kingdom,
France
Private hospitals
have shorter
LOS
3 Private (ie, psychiatric hospitals, mental health clinics)
hospitals and specifically for knee procedures
Italy, Greece,
France
Private hospitals
have longer LOS
1 ISTCs (for most diagnostic groups) United
Kingdom
No difference
Responsiveness
to demand
1 FP Germany Public hospitals
are less
responsive
Employment 1 NFP Germany No difference
2 FP Germany,
Greece
Lower staff rate
Upcoding 1 NFP + FP Italy Public hospitals
have less
“upcoding”
1 NFP + FP Italy No difference
Abbreviations: ISTCs, independent sector treatment centers; FP, for‐profit; LOS, length of stay; NFP, not‐for‐profit.
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respond more intensely to incentives than public hospitals. This is tested in a more head‐to‐head approach by
Schwierz.37 The author identifies that the introduction of a new payment system in 2014 pushed for economic disci-
pline and penalized high‐cost hospitals, creating incentives for German private hospitals to take over public hospi-
tals.37 In general, FP hospitals were also found to respond faster to increasing demand than other ownership types.
Public hospitals were more likely to default; therefore, privatization became an appealing option.37 Another study,
also conducted in Germany, analyzes changes in hospital staff after privatization. This study discovers that FP privat-
ization reduced staff per inpatient case (especially nurses, other nonphysician clinical staff, and other nonclinical staff).
Such findings were not found when NFP hospitals were the acquiring party.38 Similar finding was found in Greece; FP
hospitals seem to have lower nursing staff rates for nurses compared with the public hospitals.36
Finally, 2 studies addressed upcoding. In Italy, Vittadini et al39 looked at registering patients with nonexisting
complications to increase reimbursement. There was evidence that both NFP and FP hospitals were to some extent
engaged in “upcoding” before a specific law against upcoding in 2007 was institutionalized. No such evidence was
found for public hospitals.39 Berta et al23 also found that during 2003 to 2005, FP hospitals had more intense
upcoding practices than other hospital types. However, no ownership differences were found after 2005, probably
because of more severe checks implemented after 2003.23
3.2 | Accessibility
Included articles examine 11 different indicators of accessibility (Table 5). Most included studies do raise concerns
about accessibility to private hospitals; most of them flag this issue by analyzing the complexity of the cases and var-
ious patients' characteristics. In many countries, private providers do target higher socioeconomic classes, often
TABLE 5 Accessibility indicators overview
Concept
Number of
Studies Outcome/Indicator Type (Private) Countries Impact
Affordable 8 SES of patients (eg, employment
status, residents from deprived
versus affluent region)
Private
(ie, maternity,
psychiatric),
ISTCs
Italy, United
Kingdom,
Greece,
Spain
Public
hospitals
perform
better
2 Method of payment (ie, private health
insurance and pay out‐of‐pocket)
Private Greece
1 Payment per discharge FP Greece
Physical 3 Case‐mix differences (eg, cream
skimming)
FP, ISTCs Italy, UK
1 Access to specialty care (ie, adjusted rates
of revascularization)
Private France
1 Admission pattern Private psychiatric Italy
1 Access to preemptive registration FP France
1 Regional physical mobility (number of
nonresident patients in the region
admitted)
Private Italy
Physical 1 Mean expenditure and usage of drugs FP France No difference
Affordable 1 Access to specialty care (ie, ambulatory
care services)
Private France Private
hospitals
perform
better
1 Method of payment (ie, informal
payment)
Private Greece
Physical 1 Chance op follow‐up treatment Private psychiatric Italy
Timely 1 Waiting times ISTCs UK
Abbreviations: ISTCs, independent sector treatment centers; FP, for‐profit; SES, socioeconomic status.
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through parallel private insurance. High‐income patients hold better access to private hospitals and that waiting times
in the private sector are lower.
3.2.1 | Affordable access
In the United Kingdom, patients of private ISTCs are less likely to coming from deprived residential areas.32,40
One other study concludes that patients in private hospitals diagnosed with prostate cancer come from the more
affluent regions.41 In Greece, monthly family income is positively related to private hospital admissions.42-44 In
addition, both patients with private health insurance and rural residents are more likely to use private care ser-
vices.44 Under comparable circumstances, FP hospitals generally charge more for admitted patients falling under
the Greek Social Health Insurance fund.36 In Greece, more private patients had to pay out‐of‐pocket payments
than in public hospitals. On the other hand, and maybe remarkably, “under‐the‐table” payments were lower in
private hospitals.45
In Spain, private maternity units/hospitals proportionally treat more patients from higher socioeconomic back-
grounds.46,47 In private hospitals, the prevalence of cesarean sections was also higher among immigrants in compar-
ison with natives; no such distinctions were found within public hospitals.47 In Italy, patient characteristics differ
between private and public (psychiatric) hospitals. Older patients are less likely to be unemployed and make more
use of private services.48
3.2.2 | Physical access
Private hospitals are often accused of cream skimming and selecting more profitable patients. We found some illus-
trations to that suspicion. One Italian study argues that FP hospitals were more involved in cream skimming than
both public or NFP hospitals.23 In the United Kingdom, ISTCs treat less complex NHS patients.32,40 In France, a
higher percentage of patients with ambulatory care sensitive conditions visit public hospitals in comparison with
private hospitals, while the opposite appears for revascularization. The explanation is that in France, public and
NFP hospitals account for most acute inpatient stays and FP hospitals provide half the total revascularizations pro-
cedures.49 Regarding a specific case from Italy, Preti et al50 detected that private psychiatric facilities were less
likely to admit patients who attempted suicide prior to admission; this might serve as an indicator that high‐risk
mental health patients are less able to access private services. Patients in private acute psychiatric inpatient clinics
were also more likely to receive a follow‐up treatment (ie, rehabilitation and psychotherapy).48 Bonastre et al51
identified that in France, no significant differences exist between public and private hospitals in relation to the
use of expensive drugs (anticancer drugs), after controlling for case mix. One French study investigated if hospital
types differed in terms of access to renal (kidney) transplantation. The authors observe that FP hospitals were less
likely to have patients on the preemptive registration list than (public) academic hospitals, corrected for case‐mix
differences.52 Preemptive transplantation is associated with longer patient survival. Hence, patients in FP hospitals
might be disadvantaged in access to such treatments. Regarding regional mobility, a study from Italy found that
nonresident patients are more likely to be admitted to private hospitals compared with public hospitals when they
could not gain access to care in their own region.34 The authors point out that this is of concern, since patients
with financial resources can afford to be more mobile.34
3.2.3 | Timely access
In the United Kingdom, shorter inpatient waiting times are associated with higher rates of private hospital beds.53
3.3 | Quality of care
Quality of care encompasses many different aspects of health care. This is also reflected in the variety of outcome
variables found in this review (Table 6). The quality of care studies are structured according to the Donabedian model
of structure, process, and outcomes15 and show mixed results.
KRUSE ET AL. e441
3.3.1 | Structure
Kondilis et al36 find that FP hospitals in Greece seem to have less qualified compared with the public hospitals. One of the
possible explanations given by the authors is that FP hospitals might maximize profits and therefore minimize expenses on
nursing staff. Another possible explanation is that FP hospitals use nursing staffmore efficiently than public facilities. In Italy,
private psychiatric clinics collaborated less intensely with the community system as public psychiatric departments do.48
3.3.2 | Process
From discharge data extracted from Emilia‐Romagna hospitals, the appropriateness of admission was evaluated.
Although the number of inappropriate admissions decreased between 2001 and 2005, private hospitals exhibit in all
years more inappropriate admissions than public hospitals.54 Private hospitals are also showing less adherence to ante-
natal screening among pregnantwomen in 6 Italian regions.55 A study onAustrian hospitals shows that adherence to the
guidelines for colorectal cancer screeningwasworse amongprivatehospitals.After the implementationof a guideline for
colorectal screening, only 3.8% of private hospitals changed their routine practice versus 14.2% of public hospitals.56
3.3.3 | Outcomes
In Germany, Tiemann and Schreyögg21 analyzed hospital mortality rates. They found that, controlling for case‐mix dif-
ferences, FP and NFP hospitals showed better mortality figures than the public sector. One of the potential explana-
tions for this finding might be that publicly enforced transparency on quality indicators seems to have stimulated FP
hospitals to put comparatively more emphasis on such issues.
France was the country were the 2 included studies on quality outcomes indicated a consistently worse perfor-
mance for the private sector. Mortality rates for patients aged over 35 and admitted for heart attacks were found to
differ among hospital types. Public (nonteaching) hospitals have a lower mortality rates compared with FP hospitals.57
Rehospitalization rates, a possible indicator for worse quality, differ as well between French hospitals. Private hospi-
tals have higher rates of 30‐day all‐cause rehospitalizations of older patients compared with public providers.58
In Italy, regional degrees of privatization (1993‐2003) are used as a quasinatural experimental design to investi-
gate the association between public and private hospitals spending on (the reduction of) avoidable mortality. Spending
increases on public delivery of health care services was associated with increased reduction in avoidable mortality.
TABLE 6 Quality of care indicators overview
Concept Number of Studies Outcome/Indicator Type (Private) Country Impact
Structure 1 Discontinuity of care Private psychiatric Italy Public hospitals
perform better
1 Qualification staff FP Greece
Process 2 Adherence guideline and
screening
Private Austria and Italy
1 Appropriate admission Private Italy
Outcome 2 Mortality rate (avoidable
mortality)
FP, private France, Italy
1 Rehospitalization rates Private France
Outcome 1 Patient's experiences ISTCs
United
Kingdom No difference
Outcome 3 Mortality (risk of dying) Private hospitals,
NFP and FP
Germany, Italy Private hospitals
perform better
1 Readmission (likely to be
readmitted in 30 days)
Private hospitals Italy
1 Patients experience
(regarding amenities)
ISTCs United Kingdom
Abbreviations: ISTCs, independent sector treatment centers; FP, for‐profit; NFP, not‐for‐profit.
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However, no such positive effects were found with respect to spending increases on private health care services. This
implies that increases of spending on private health care services might hamper the possible reduction in avoidable
mortality by investments in the public sector.59 Contrary results indicate that patients in private hospitals are less
likely to be readmitted and less likely to die within 30 days after discharge, although the impact of the latter was found
to be much lower.60 This corresponds to the results of a multilevel analysis, also from Italy, which assessed that the
risk of dying was significantly less in private hospitals.61
Both Pérotin et al62 and Owusu‐Frimpong et al63 examine UK patient experiences. The latter study finds that
users of ISTCs have higher satisfaction rates than the users of public facilities for amenities, for instance, obtaining
attention from doctors.63 However, Pérotin did not find a significant difference on the reported overall patient expe-
riences between public and private clinics. Differences that were found seemed to relate to other variables such as
patient characteristics.62
4 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This review points to various messages. Findings on efficiency show mixed results, but do suggest that the public sec-
tor is at least as or more efficient as the private sector. Many papers mention that the institutional context might be an
important constraint for the efficiency for the private sector. For example, Austrian NFP hospitals seem to be
“induced” to operate with high levels of operational efficiency. There exists quite some evidence that the private sec-
tor seems more sensitive to incentives than the public sector. This was shown for a range of indicators such as
responding to changes in demand, upcoding, or adjusting LOS. Differences in LOS seem to depend on type of treat-
ment, whereby consistent evidence shows the private sector has shorter LOS for hip procedures compared with the
public sector and type of payment: Per diem funding increases LOS in private settings more than in public surround-
ings, especially for mental health. As expected, in South European countries and also in the United Kingdom where a
parallel and partly duplicate system exists between private and public provisions, the private sector is used by the
more affluent population, who may experience, for example, lower waiting times and better amenities. This suggests
that universal access and a broader inclusion of private providers in the mainstream health system might be an impor-
tant option to reduce such disparities in access. The same goes for cream‐skimming, which, although higher in private
hospitals, might be prevented by sophisticated case‐mix corrections in the payment structures. Private hospitals may
perform better on observable quality outcomes such as for example exist in Germany and Italy for mortality and
readmissions. In France, private hospitals specialize in certain (elective) procedures. One might expect better out-
comes for private hospitals as a result of such specializations, but in France, the findings predominantly seem to favor
public hospitals. This casts doubt on the advantages of private hospital specialization.
This realist review analyzes a complex and context‐dependent issue and thus is subject to various limitations.
Included studies used a wide range of indicators; research designs vary substantially. This makes it somewhat prob-
lematic to extrapolate or generalize these findings. Many findings relate to specific diseases and/or indicators implying
they do not necessarily hold for a broader spectrum of diseases. Studies covering efficiency showed more consistency
among their use of parameters and methodology. We also were able to only include studies from a limited number of
EU countries. Most evidence compromises a few countries: Italy, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Greece.
However, these 5 countries do cover for a substantial part of the total EU population and—more importantly—cover
for most health care system types (tax‐funded or social insurance, multiple payer and single payer, and decentralized
and more centralized). Including articles not written in English could broaden the scope of this research. Furthermore,
transferability of our results from one country to another is a difficult and complex task.64 The performance of differ-
ent types of hospital ownership may be highly dependent on their embeddedness in health system ecosystems.
Indeed, private hospitals may compete, specialize, or complement public providers, which could partly explain conflict-
ing outcomes. A more thorough understanding of the position of the private sector in the wider health system could
aid policy makers in designing sound and evidence‐based policies in this area.
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We provide policymakers with several take‐away messages. Firstly, the private hospital sector consists of many
complex layers. Both a polarizing political debate and traditional economist reasoning towards the superiority of a reg-
ulated market also in health care do not suit the complexity of the issue. Secondly, our evidence shows that one
should take a careful note to the incentives built into the health care systems, because they seem to be an important
driver for either the divergence or convergence of the private and public sector. For‐profit providers seem to respond
more intensely to incentives. Fine tuning such structure, eg, hospital payment systems, becomes even more important
if the role of the private sector increases. Thirdly, despite popular opinion that enhancing the role of the private sector
increases efficiency, we do not find a lot of evidence that supports this claim. Most evidence shows that public hos-
pitals are as efficient as or more efficient than private counterparts. For Beveridge countries, we found that access to
private hospitals is substantially worse for patients with either low incomes or a more complex case mix. Finally, this
review highlights that policy “shopping” among research results is dangerous. The evidence on private sector perfor-
mance should be critically assessed; research designs (ie, indicator specification, methodology, and sample selection)
do cause divergent results between studies. Our assessment is that the supposed superior performance of the private
sector—and especially the private nonprofit hospital sector—for Beveridge countries depends on full inclusion in the
health system to guarantee broader access to the private sector.
Overall, this review could contribute to the discussion on the role of the private sector in providing hospital ser-
vices in the EU and how different systems, institutions, and incentive structures might affect the public and private
hospital sectors.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 Search string
Scopus
Before 2008
Search in title, abstract, and key
Block 1: (private ‐within 2 words‐ hospital) AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health
care ‐within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3
words‐ delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 2: hospital AND privatization AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐
within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐
delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 3: (“public private*” ‐within 3 words‐ hospital) AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR
(health care ‐within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission”OR “patient admission”OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3
words‐ delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 4
“hospital ownership” AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐within 3 words‐
access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐ delivery” OR “health
care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Scopus
Block 5
“for profit hospital” AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐within 3 words‐
access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐ delivery” OR “health
care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
And no keywords “Medicare” OR “US” OR “United States”
Limit to Journal, Article, English
After 2008
Search in title, abstract, and key
Block 1: (private ‐within 2 words‐ hospital) AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health
care ‐within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3
words‐ delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 2: hospital AND privatization AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐
within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐
delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 3: “public private*” ‐within 3 words‐ hospital) AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR
(health care ‐within 3 words‐ access*) OR “hospital admission”OR “patient admission”OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3
words‐ delivery” OR “health care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
OR
Block 4
“hospital ownership” AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐within 3 words
access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐ delivery” OR “health
care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
Block 5
“for profit hospital” AND efficiency OR “health care quality” OR “quality of health care” OR (health care ‐within 3 words‐
access*) OR “hospital admission” OR “patient admission” OR afford* OR “health care ‐within 3 words‐ delivery” OR “health
care utilization” OR “health care availability” AND NOT “job satisfaction”
And no keywords “Medicare”
Limit to Journal, Article, English
Search string: EconLit & SocINDEX
Search terms (AB “private w/2 hospital” OR AB (privatization AND hospital)
OR AB “hospital ownership” OR AB “for profit hospitals” OR AB “public
private w/3 hospital” OR AB “PPP w/3 hospital”) OR
(SU (“private w/2 hospital” OR (privatization AND hospital) OR “hospital
ownership” OR “for profit hospitals” OR “public private w/3 hospital” OR
AB “PPP w/3 hospital”)
Search Options
Published Date: 20000101‐20151231
Source types
Academic Journals and English
Search string: Web of Science
TS = “private hospital” OR
TS = (privatization AND hospital) OR
TS = “hospital ownership” OR
TS = “for profit hospital” OR
TS = “non profit hospital” OR
TS = (“public private” AND hospital) OR
TS = (PPP AND hospital)
AND LANGUAGE: (English) AND DOCUMENT TYPES: (Article)
Indexes = SCI‐EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI,
ESCI Timespan = 2000‐2017
TABLE A2 Quality appraisal form
Component Ratings of Study: Score Justification/Comments
Strong = 3/Modest = 2/Weak = 1
A) Design
Outcome of interest as main (3) or control variable (2/1)?
Cross‐sectional (2/1) or longitudinal (3)
Prospective (3) or retrospective (2/1)
Is the method of analysis appropriate? (strong, modest, weak)
Is the method of analysis sufficiently rigorous? (strong, modest, weak)
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Component Ratings of Study: Score Justification/Comments
B) Quality of reporting
Enough data have been presented to show how the authors arrived
at their findings (Strong, Modest, Weak)
Enough information is given what the methodological design is?
(Strong, Modest, Weak)
Enough information is given where the data comes from and what
the characteristics are of the sample (ie, summary statistics and
sample sizes). (Strong, Modest, Weak)
C) Selection bias
Strong: The selected individuals/hospitals are very likely to be
representative of the target population
Moderate: The selected individuals/hospitals are at least somewhat
likely to be representative of the target population
Weak: The selected individuals/hospitals are not likely to be
representative of the target population
D) Confounders (ie, region, demographics)
Strong: will be assigned to those articles that controlled for most
relevant confounders
Moderate: will be given to those studies that controlled for relevant
confounders, but explicitly mentions that it missed some relevant confounders
Weak: will be assigned when the relevant confounders were not controlled for
E) Data collection methods
Strong: The data collection tools have been shown to be valid; and the data
collection tools have been shown to be reliable
Moderate: The data collection tools have been shown to be valid; and the data
collection tools have not been shown to be reliable or reliability is not described.
Weak: The data collection tools have not been shown to be valid or both
reliability and validity are not described.
F) Outcome variable
The choice of measurement of the outcome variable (accessibility, quality of care
efficiency) is valid?
Strong: Clear connection with 1 of the 3 concepts, and/or is generally accepted
by scholars
Moderate: A couple of validity issues arise. The connection between the
outcome variable and the concepts of interest is moderate (eg, only one disease
is analyzed)
Weak: Serious concerns about how the outcome variable (1 of the 3 concepts) is
measured
G) Number of hospitals
Strong: More than 10 hospitals are included in the analysis
Moderate: Between 3 and 10 hospitals are included in the analysis
Weak: Only 2 hospitals are compared
H) Context
Strong: Includes many different contexts/regions, high complexity in
demographic characteristics
Moderate: Combines 2 or 3 different regions
Weak: One very specific region with specific characteristics
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Component Ratings of Study: Score Justification/Comments
J) Independence
Is this an independent study? Yes (3) Debatable (2) No (1)
K) Drop‐outs—only if applicable
Strong: (If applicable: will be assigned when the follow‐up rate is 80% or greater).
Moderate (If applicable: will be assigned when the follow‐up rate is 60%‐79%).
Weak: (If applicable: will be assigned when a follow‐up rate is less than 60% or if
the withdrawals and drop‐outs were not described).
Total score
Additional comments Answers to comments
Do the results seem to be valid?
Do the results seem to be reliable?
Are the results relevant? Does it fall within the scope of our research question?
Can the results be generalized?
In or out If needed: justification
Final judgment made based on the score and the additional comments
TABLE A3 Excluded references in quality appraisal
Browne, J., L. Jamieson, J. Lewsey, J. van derMeulen, L. Copley and N. Black (2008). “Case‐mix & patients' reports of outcome
in Independent Sector Treatment Centres: comparison with NHS providers.” BMC health services research 8: 78.
Caballer‐Tarazona, M., A. Clemente‐Collado and D. Vivas‐Consuelo (2016). “A cost and performance comparison of public
private partnership and public hospitals in Spain.” Health Economics Review 6(1): 1‐7.
Colais, P., L. Pinnarelli, D. Fusco, M. Davoli, M. Braga and C. A. Perucci (2013). “The impact of a pay‐for‐performance system
on timing to hip fracture surgery: experience from the Lazio Region (Italy).” BMC health services research 13: 393.
De Girolamo, G., A. Barbato, R. Bracco, A. Gaddini, R. Miglio, P. Morosini, B. Norcio, A. Picardi, E. Rossi and P. Rucci (2007).
“Characteristics and activities of acute psychiatric in‐patient facilities: national survey in Italy.” The British Journal of
Psychiatry 191(2): 170‐177.
Grilli, R., P. Guastaroba and F. Taroni (2007). “Effect of hospital ownership status and payment structure on the adoption and
use of drug‐eluting stents for percutaneous coronary interventions.”CanadianMedical Association Journal 176(2): 185‐190.
Keong, N., D. Ricketts, N. Alakeson and P. Rust (2004). “Pressure sores following elective total hip arthroplasty: pitfalls of
misinterpretation.” Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England 86: 174‐176.
Kontodimopoulos, N., P. Nanos and D. Niakas (2006). “Balancing efficiency of health services and equity of access in remote
areas in Greece.” Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 76: 49‐57.
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